This study presents the complex issues related to hybrid organizational structure, i.e., nonprofit organizations that own for-profit subsidiaries, in the healthcare and insurance industries. The tax code allows chartering of tax-exempt entities if they are organized exclusively for a benevolent purpose with no private individual benefitting from its earnings. These organizations, however, can charter for-profit subsidiaries. This hybrid form has increased in prevalence in the healthcare industry in recent years and raises the question of when an organization no longer warrants nonprofit status. We discuss legal issues related to tax code and competitiveness and illustrate with a case study.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession, the United States faces a host of difficulties that need to be alleviated to assure the longterm well-being of its citizenry. Two issues in particular have received a great deal of attention by policy makers, legislators and the media.
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Journal of Business Law and Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2016 The first matter is the size and unsustainability of federal budget deficits and the second is the lack of availability and affordability of quality health care. Solving the first problem is simple in theory; the federal government needs to increase revenues, decrease expenditures or some combination of the two. Accomplishing such an initiative is not as simple in practice, however. Questions of fairness regarding where and from whom additional funds are raised and expenditures are denied will always be raised.
Ensuring the public's access to affordable health care is a more complicated issue. The United States has a complex system of health care delivery and financing with public and private and for-profit and non-profit providers and insurers. In addition, there are a substantial number of arrangements between non-profit and forprofit organizations.
The health care delivery and financing system has seen a great deal of consolidation in recent years, both horizontal and vertical (Haas-Wilson & Gaynor, 1998) . Questions have been raised as to whether this trend has resulted in an anticompetitive industry that is not serving the public as well as it should (Gaynor & Haas-Wilson, 1999 ).
This study focuses on the tax and antitrust issues related to a subset of organizations in the health care delivery and financing system that we refer to as those with a "hybrid" organizational structure. These are organizations that are either nonprofit health care organizations that own for-profit medical insurance subsidiaries or for-profit health care organizations that own non-profit insurance subsidiaries. These organizations have incentives to use the non-profit entity to further the profitability of the other. Included in these incentives is one to expand their operations and monopolize local markets.
We discuss the legal matters of, one, when these organizations should be subject to taxation and, two, when they should be required to cease expansionary activities.
Introduction to the Law of Non-profit Corporations
An important legal issue facing the healthcare and medical insurance industry today is when a non-profit corporation no longer warrants non-profit status.
Normally, income and profits are subject to federal income taxation pursuant to the rules contained in the Internal Revenue Code. However, provisions in the code allow for the chartering of tax-exempt entities known as non-profit corporations. Rules regarding whether an organization qualifies as a tax-exempt entity are stipulated in § 501© (3) of the code and applicable IRS Regulations (hereinafter denoted by Treas.
Reg.). These regulations state that a non-profit corporation is one that is organized and operated exclusively for a charitable, scientific or educational purpose and that no part of the organization's net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Even if an organization receives tax-exempt status, it is still free to start joint ventures with for-profit corporations and own for-profit subsidiaries. These hybrid organizational structures can be as simple as a common parent-subsidiary relationship to a highly complex array of various non-profits, for-profits, and joint ventures with both other non-profits and for-profit corporations. In large complex situations, it is often difficult for even the participants in the business arrangements to understand the organizational dynamics and corporate control of the entity. Problems can arise in these ventures when the for-profit entity involved benefits from the tax-exempt status of the non-profit corporation.
62
Journal of Business Law and Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2016 The IRS has been highly attentive to these situations and reserves the right to revoke the tax-exempt status of a non-profit when it violates the 4-part test it has developed in Treas. Reg. §1.501© (3) 1to determine if tax-exemption is proper. Cafadi and Cherry (2008) The Organizational Test first looks specifically at the non-profit's articles of organization to determine if its purpose is one that warrants tax-exempt status. The IRS can determine if the organization was chartered for an exempt purpose specified in § 501© (3) by reviewing the articles of organization. According to Treas. Reg. §1.501©(3) 1, "an organization fulfills the requirements of the Organizational Test if it is "organized exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if its articles of organization [. . .] (a) limit the purposes of such organization to one or more exempt purposes; and (b) do not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities , in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes." This is likely the easiest test for an organization to satisfy because of the limited scope of information the IRS examines to justify tax exemption. The Organizational Test can be viewed as a "birth certificate test" with the IRS looking at the non-profit's articles of organization and any additional written documents for which the organization was created to determine if the original purpose of the organization was one that justifies tax exemption.
It is also important to understand that these documents may change over the course of an organization's life as it reorganizes or creates new ventures and additional organizations. Consequently, the Organizational Test is applied to an organization throughout its existence.
The Operational Test heading, which can be broken down into the remaining three tests (the Operational Test, the Private Increment Test, and the Political Activities Test) must then be examined in light of the various activities the organization is involved in to determine if tax-exempt status is proper. The Operational Test ascertains whether or not the organization engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501©(3). The crux of this test is the provision that the organization will not satisfy the requirements of tax-exemption "if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose" (Treas. Reg. §1.501© (3) 1-(b)).
The IRS will generally assess the character of the activities the organization is conducting to determine if it deserves tax-exempt status. It will specifically look at the purpose "towards which an organization's activities are directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves," to determine "the organization's right to be classified" as a non-profit organization (Golden Rule Church Association v. Commissioner, 1964, p. 728) . The test considers several factors regarding an organization's operation.
Included in these are the particular manner in which an organization's activities are conducted, the commercial nature of those activities and the existence and extent of annual or accumulated profits (American Institute For Economic Research v. United States, 1962, p. 938) .
In addition, the test includes determination of whether or not the type of business the organization is conducting is ordinarily carried on by commercial forprofit corporations, and if the organization is being operated primarily for a nonexempt purpose. The court held in B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 1978 that competition with commercial firms is strong evidence of the predominance of a nonexempt commercial purpose. It is difficult for an organization that is engaged in multiple businesses and ventures to satisfy this test because of the extent to which the IRS will look at the totality of the organization's activities (p. 358).
The Private Increment Test is stated in Treas. Reg. §1.501©(3) 1 -©(2) as "[a]n organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals." This regulation defines a private shareholder or individual as "persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization." If it is determined that a private individual has received a benefit from the non-profit organization then its exempt status may be in jeopardy.
In analyzing whether or not an organization has violated the Private Increment Test, regulators assess four factors. The first is the reasonableness of any funds or salaries paid by the organization to a private individual. The second factor is the reason or reasons why the funds were paid. Third, the type of agreement that confers the benefit is considered. Lastly, the statuses of persons in the organization who formed the agreement and issued the funds are evaluated. By considering these factors, regulators will determine if a private individual has received a benefit from the tax-exempt organization and if this private increment warrants a revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status.
Several different cases on the topic of private increment have arisen in the last few decades. These cases involve private individuals receiving benefits from the taxexempt status in many different types of organizations, including religious institutions, educational institutions, and charitable organizations. A lead case that discusses the Private Increment Test in regards to a charitable organization is United Cancer Council, Inc. v. C.I.R., 1999. In this case, it was held that even though the charitable organization had an exclusive arrangement with its fundraiser and the fact that a large fraction of expenses for the fundraising campaign were initially fronted by the fundraiser.
Finally, the Political Activities Test, as stated in Treas. Reg. §1.501©(3) 1 -©(3),is used to determine if the organization influences legislation through lobbying efforts or through other efforts designed to influence the political process and legislators. If it is determined that the organization seeks to influence legislation, both for the passage or non-passage of legislation, then it cannot satisfy the requirements of §501© (3). A non-profit may not participate in any "substantial lobbying" or any "electoral campaigning". If an organization desires to continue to enjoy its taxexempt status, then it must refrain from participating in any political activities prohibited by the regulations. Substantial lobbying and electoral campaigning are included in these prohibited activities (Slee v. Commissioner, 1930) .
These tests are not only applicable when the non-profit corporation is chartered; they are applicable throughout the entire lifetime of the corporation. As a result, an organization must be constantly cognizant of its activities to protect its taxexempt status. These tests become more complex when the organization at hand has a hybrid organizational structure of joint ventures and parent-subsidiary relationships with for-profit organizations. Adequate safeguards need to be instituted to ensure compliance with the regulations.
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Journal of Business Law and Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2016 One potential mechanism is appointing a §501© (3) Compliance Officer who oversees inter-firm relationships and ensures regulations are being followed. This corporate officer would be responsible for ensuring that the organizational dynamics and corporate control of the entity are maintained in compliance with all rules concerning §501© (3) and all applicable regulations.
Non-profits with a hybrid organizational structure are more numerous than the general public may surmise. They are particularly abundant in the health care industry. Recent decades have seen numerous non-profit hospital corporations starting joint ventures with for-profit corporations and owning for-profit health insurance subsidiaries.
Examples of these organizational schemes include the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, a non-profit that owns University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center Insurance Services, a mix of several different for-profit and non-profit subsidiaries. Bay State Health is another example of this type of organization. Kaiser Permanente takes the reverse form: a for profit medical system that owns non-profit insurance subsidiaries. There are several reasons why a non-profit healthcare provider may desire a hybrid structure.
An organization may want to isolate risk amongst several different entities through the process of incorporation. A non-profit health care provider that is affiliated with an educational institution may want to start a for-profit corporation to market the fruit of their research. A non-profit parent health care provider may also want to start a for profit health insurance subsidiary to provide a reliable source of patients to its facilities. These scenarios are generally permissible. However, the IRS has strict guidelines on when joint ventures and for-profit subsidiaries are properly administered and the tax-exempt status of the non-profit involved is maintained.
Revenue Ruling 98-15 1998-1 C.B. 718 discusses the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of joint ventures involving non-profit corporations. The ruling delineates under what conditions a non-profit corporation may engage in a joint venture with a for-profit corporation. It gives direction as to how the joint venture must be managed for the non-profit corporation to maintain its tax-exempt status.
The Ruling states that when a non-profit starts a joint venture with a for-profit corporation and incorporates the joint venture as an LLC treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes, the activities of the LLC will be considered to be the activities of the non-profit partner when determining the tax-exempt status of the non-profit partner.
The ruling states that a joint venture will satisfy the Operational Test if the non-profit partner furthers a charitable purpose in its participation and acts exclusively in furtherance of its tax-exempt purpose and only incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit owners.
Revenue Ruling 98-15 1998-1 C.B. 718 also states that a non-profit organization may contract a private party to conduct activities on behalf of and use the assets of the non-profit as long as the non-profit retains ultimate authority over its assets and the activities managed by the private party and the terms of the agreement are reasonable. If a private party is permitted to control or use the non-profit's activities or assets for its own benefit, and that benefit is not incidental to furthering of tax-exempt purposes, the non-profit will fail the Operational Test and a revocation of the non-profit's tax-exempt status would be proper. The ruling effectively pronounces that a non-profit may engage in a joint venture with a for-profit corporation if the non-profit maintains control of its assets and does not bestow benefits on the private owners of the for profit organization. 2016 It follows that these concepts would also be held true in a parent-subsidiary relationship as exists in the case of a non-profit health care provider starting a forprofit subsidiary health insurance corporation.
Antitrust Issues in the Healthcare and Insurance Industries
Another issue that derives from the size and business practices of certain nonprofit corporations and specifically health insurance corporations is the application and enforcement of state and federal antitrust legislation on them. Beginning in the late 1800's, the federal government and likewise state governments began regulating the competitive practices in which businesses were engaged.
There exists a long historical tradition prior to this era in Europe and in the common-law for the regulation of competition and competitive practices of individuals and businesses by the state. The reason for this regulation is that unfair and anticompetitive practices such as the monopolization of industries and price fixing are viewed as detracting from social welfare due to the monopolist's ability to raise the prices of its goods or services beyond a price that the market would set.
Practices such as monopolization, price fixing and the sharing of pricing information among various firms in a given industry was made illegal through various legislative acts such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. In the last decade, the healthcare industry has seen significant consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (Jaklevic, 2002) . These actions have resulted in a market that is highly concentrated by FTC and DOJ standards and "many large cities such as Boston, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, St. Louis and San Francisco (and others) have come to be dominated by 2-3 large hospital systems." (Gaynor, 2006) . Included in these mergers and acquisitions are hybrid organizations acquiring hospital and healthcare facilities. A pertinent question is whether or not these acquisitions by the non-profit healthcare parent are designed to expand the network of the subsidiary for-profit insurance corporation, whereby the parent could lose its non-profit status.
History of Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry
It may be difficult for one to imagine a time in American history when the shifting of the various risks associated with business and life through the use of insurance contracts was not considered commerce. If it does not bestow benefits, then the rule of law of the non-profit health industry should hold whereby the organization is subject to antitrust legislation.
A Brief History of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the fabric of the city is dominated by a fierce rivalry in the marketplace for health care and health insurance. The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) dominates the landscape on buildings, billboards, and in the local media. Atop of the former US Steel Tower, the tallest building in Pittsburgh, the letters UPMC shine out over the city. UPMC touts the financial successes of the non-profit company. Last year alone, UPMC posted $9 Billion in revenues and $406 Million in operating profits. However, Pittsburgh was not always dominated by corporate giant UPMC. It became the regional powerhouse it is today only over the last few decades.
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center was founded in two separate places by two separate entities. Both founders had intentions of a charitable and benevolent future for their institutions. In the early 1990's UPMC began to buy out smaller Pittsburgh based hospitals for the intended purpose of being able to offer more specialized treatments to even more patients. In 1990, UPMC officially acquired the previously affiliated Montefiore Hospital. Marquette & Fisher 77 Originally a hospital founded by Pittsburgh's Jewish community, the facility now specializes in many different types of complex procedures, including transplants, and is located adjacent to UPMC Presbyterian, of which it is now a part. UPMC acquired Shadyside Hospital in 1996 and the facility is now the center of UPMC's oncology division.
In 1997, UPMC started its Insurance Services Division for its stated purposes of complementing its provider network and gaining efficiencies in its business model.
In 2008, UPMC continued its growth by merging with Mercy Hospital, a Catholic hospital, which was originally founded by the Sisters of Mercy in Pittsburgh. In addition to these mergers and acquisitions, UPMC has completed many more business deals expanding its enterprises all the way from Northwest Pennsylvania to Dublin, Ireland to Japan.
At this point, UPMC has become a major player not only in the health care provider business but also in the health insurance business and has become one of the largest corporations in the city of Pittsburgh. The question then becomes has UPMC outgrown its non-profit status? Has the reason for this quick growth been for the purpose of expanding the services it offers its patients or to expand its UPMC Insurance Service's subscriber network, a for-profit corporation?
Conclusion
There are two distinct legal issues relevant to medical care and insurance hybrids that are illustrated by the UPMC -UPMC Insurance Services case study. The first issue is whether or not the parent non-profit health care provider in these arrangements warrants tax-exempt status. The second issue is whether or not the systematic acquisitions of health care facilities by the parent non-profit and tying arrangements with its insurance subsidiary justify the enforcement of federal antitrust legislation.
The major issue to consider is whether or not the for profit insurance subsidiary is either in control of any of parent non-profit's assets or is benefitting from any of the medical care facility's activities. This situation would violate the provisions of § 501(c)(3) and would justify a revocation of the non-profit's taxexempt status. The regulations also suggest that the systematic acquisition of hospitals and health care facilities by a parent non-profit hospital corporation will violate its tax-exempt status when the main purpose of the acquisitions is to expand the network of the subsidiary for-profit insurance corporation. This would give the forprofit subsidiary the benefit of being able to expand its subscriber network if tying arrangements exist in its insurance contracts. These situations should be closely monitored by tax regulators for possible action.
In addition, the systematic acquisition of medical care facilities by non-profit healthcare organizations should be monitored by antitrust regulators to gauge their effects on the competitiveness of the market. Scrutiny should be stronger for hybrid organizations since there is a greater incentive for these organizations to engage in anti-competitive behavior than their healthcare counterparts that don't own for-profit insurance companies.
